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Abstract—With the expansion of the Internet of Things industry, 
the information security of Internet of Things devices attracts 
much attention. Traditional encryption algorithms require 
sensitive information such as keys to be stored in memory, and also 
need the support of operating system, which is obviously 
unacceptable for resource-constrained Internet of Things 
terminals. Physical not cloning function by extracting the chip is 
inevitable in the process of manufacturing process deviation, the 
introduction of the corresponding function relationship between 
incentive and response, not to need the storage user sensitive 
information, and only when electricity will respond, in power 
response immediately disappear, this can save a lot of resources of 
equipment and the power consumption. However, PUF is 
vulnerable to modeling attacks, and the traditional methods such 
as the challenge obfuscation method are time-invariant, which is 
equivalent to adding a fixed function to the front stage of a 
traditional APUF circuit. Therefore, it can be potentially 
modelling attacked with sufficient CRPs. In order to further 
enhance APUF circuit resistance to modelling attack, this paper 
proposes a dual-LFSR-based APUF circuit with time-variant 
challenge obfuscation. Besides, traditional authentication scheme 
generally adopts the one-time key scheme to enhance resistance to 
man-in-the-middle attack. The two-time authentication scheme 
proposed in this paper can improve the ability of RFID system to 
resist man-in-the-middle attack without sacrificing CRPs. 
 
Index Terms—information security, dual-LFSR, man-in-the-
middle attack, two-time authentication 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ith the rapid development of information technology, the 
Internet of Thing(IoT) industry has expanded rapidly, at 
present, the world has more than 10 billion devices are 
connected, and in the next five years is expected to deploy more 
than five times the device [1]. The market demand of Radio 
Frequency Identification (RFID) and other electronic device is 
becoming more and more big. While the development of 
Internet of Things technology brings great convenience to 
people's life, the information security of Internet of Things 
devices also attracts much attention. In the information society, 
information security is a problem we have to face.  
At present, the most widely used equipment safe solution is 
to adopt the traditional software encryption algorithms, such as 
AES, RSA  and digital signature [2], but the traditional software 
encryption algorithm is usually the user's sensitive information 
 
 
(such as key) block is stored in the EEPROM, FLASH [3] and 
other nonvolatile memory or storage in the power supply power 
for random access memory (RAM). As IoT devices are 
resource-limited hardware platforms, their volume and power 
consumption are strictly limited. However, traditional software 
encryption algorithms not only need to store sensitive 
information in memory, but also need the support of a larger 
operating system, which is obviously unacceptable for 
resource-limited IoT terminals [4]. In addition, traditional 
software encryption algorithms need to store sensitive 
information in memory, which is vulnerable to physical attacks 
such as side channel attack, intrusion/semi-intrusion attack [5]. 
Traditional software encryption algorithms are quite vulnerable 
to such attacks. 
Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) takes advantage of the 
inevitable random differences in chip making, extracts them 
and presents them as binary sequences of signals [6]. In the 
manufacturing process of an integrated circuit, even if two 
chips are identical in structure and so on, there must be a small 
difference in internal delay and so on. This difference is also 
uncontrollable to the manufacturer, so PUF circuit cannot be 
cloned. And PUF circuit respond only when the electricity, the 
electrical response immediately disappear, which not only 
overcomes the traditional software encryption algorithms rely 
on storage key faults, also greatly improve the ability against 
the attack of the equipment, reduces the equipment and power 
consumption of resources, is very suitable for the Internet of 
things terminal information encryption. 
However, traditional PUF circuits are seriously threatened by 
modeling attacks. The attacker collects a large number of CRPs 
of PUF circuit, uses machine learning algorithm to build a 
model, and then predicts undiscovered CRPs of PUF circuit. 
With the deepening of the research on PUF structure, the 
prediction rate of modeling attack on traditional PUF circuit is 
getting higher and higher. As a strong PUF, APUF is widely 
used in identity authentication due to its large CRPs. However, 
due to the inherent linearity of APUF circuits, conventional 
APUF is relatively easy to be breached in the face of machine 
learning attacks [7]. At present, there are several methods to 
improve APUF's resistance to machine learning attacks, one of 
which is the challenge obfuscation method [8]. The pros and 
cons are as follows. 
Pros: Without changing the underlying architecture of APUF, 
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the external challenge of APUF is obfuscated to break the linear 
relationship between the traditional challenge and response. 
Cons: The current challenge obfuscation methods for APUF 
are basically time-invariant, which is equivalent to adding a 
fixed function to the front stage of a traditional APUF circuit. 
Therefore, it can be potentially modelling attacked with 
sufficient CRPs.  
In order to further enhance APUF circuit resistance to 
modelling attack, this paper proposes a dual-LFSR-based 
APUF circuit with time-variant challenge obfuscation. 
In addition, in order to resist the man-in-the-middle attack, 
the traditional authentication scheme generally adopts the one-
time key scheme. Once CRP is applied, it is immediately 
discarded. The scheme also sacrifices a large amount of CRPs 
resources while enhancing the resistance of RFID systems to 
attack. In this paper, combined with the proposed dual LFSR 
APUF structure, the two-time authentication mechanism can 
enhance the man-in-the-middle attack of RFID systems without 
sacrificing CRPs resources.  
II. PROPOSED PUF DESIGN 
This section presents a focus on a variety of measures, such 
as randomness and reliability design method for dual-LFSR 
arbiter PUF, we first discuss how to improve randomness of 
APUF, avoid the path up and low in the FPGA chip to generate 
serious deviation, we also discussed how to improve the 
reliability of APUF to makes it to be implement on the given 45 
nm FPGA chip. Moreover, when the FPGA platform is changed, 
it can be adjusted adapatively to improve its randomness and 
other measures. Finally, after the architecture of the underlying 
APUF is determined, the principle of dual LFSR is discussed, 
and it is shown that dual LFSR architecture can obscure 
challenges, thus improving its ability to resist machine learning 
attacks. 
A. Design method of dual LFSR arbiter PUF 
The design flow shown in Fig. 1 can be used to design the 
dual-LFSR APUF. On the whole, the dual-LFSR APUF is 
divided into two parts: the top circuit and the bottom circuit. 
Bottom circuit is a basic APUF, and its design focuses on the 
realization platform of APUF circuit, that is, it is implemented 
on FPGA board. APUF circuit based on FPGA board will face 
serious problems of randomness and reliability. Therefore, 
when we design the bottom APUF circuit, we need to improve 
its randomness and reliability to facilitate the operation of the 
top circuit, which is also beneficial to the realization of the 
authentication protocol against man-in-the-middle attack. 
In the process of FPGA automatic layout and routing, 
APUF's upper and lower paths will not be completely 
symmetrical, which will introduce certain layout and routing 
deviation. In order to eliminate the deviation as much as 
possible, the Randomness Adjustment Module is introduced, 
which mainly works in the System initialization stage. When 
the RST key on the FPGA board is pressed, the system enters 
the System initialization stage. The detailed working process of 
Randomness Adjustment Module is described in Section Ⅱ-B. 
After the signal passes through the Randomness Adjustment 
Module and the Voter Module, the randomness and reliability 
of the responses generated by APUF get better. In order to make 
APUF more resistant to attack, meantime, the proposed APUF 
can be used for authentication against man-in-the-middle attack. 
The dual LFSR structure is introduced, which generates the real 
challenge signal by  two LFSRs jumping to each other with 
certain rules. This mechanism of generating real challenges can 
effectively enhance the resistance to machine learning attack of 
APUF by obfuscating real challenges. The detailed working 
process of  dual-LFSR is described in Section Ⅱ-C. 
After System initialization, the path deviation caused by the 
asymmetry of APUF's upper and lower delay paths is basically 
eliminated. In order to improve the reliability of APUF circuit, 
the Voter Module is introduced, and the principle of minority 
subordinate to majority is adopted to improve the reliability of 
APUF at the cost of time redundancy. The analysis shows that 
the greater the time redundancy is, the stronger the reliability 
will be. Therefore, it is necessary to make a tradeoff  between 
reliability and redundancy better when implementing in 
combination with specific scenarios. Furthermore, in order to 
further obscure challenge response pair, the output of the 
former Voter Module needs to go through the XOR gate, and 
after several cycles, the outputs of the XOR gate inputs the D 
flip-flop as a bit response of the PUF circuit. The detailed 
working process of Voter Module and subsequent module is 
Section Ⅱ-D. 
 
Fig. 1.  The design flow for dual LFSR arbiter PUF 
START
1.System initialization
2.End initialization.
The response of APUF is changed to signal Q by 
the voter
3.Signal Q input XOR gate,while feeds into the 
multiplexer address input end of the challenge 
generator
4.Signal Q is fed into the XOR gate and a response 
bit Is generated  after several cycles
End
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B. Design of Randomness Adjustment Module 
When the RST key on the FPGA board is pressed, the PUF 
circuit enters the System initialization stage. The Randomness 
Adjustment Module begin to count the pulse signal of the input 
to APUF, and at the same time begin to count the "0" of the 
output of the arbiter (D flip-flop). After a certain number of 
pulses enter the APUF, the proportion of "0" in the response 
bitstream of the arbiter is calculated. If the proportion is close 
to 50%, it indicates that  delay of the upper and lower two paths 
of APUF is basically same delay, namely, the randomness of 
APUF is relatively good. On the country, if the proportion is far 
from 50%, it indicates that deviation of the upper path and lower 
path of APUF is relatively large, and the randomness needs to 
be adjusted by compensating for the shorter delay path so that 
the upper and lower paths are symmetric.  
The principle of compensation is successive approximation, 
that is, a small fixed delay amount is added to the shorter delay 
path, and then the proportion of "0" in the response bit of the 
arbiter is calculated again. If it is still far from 50%, the 
compensation continues until the proportion is close to 50%. 
At the initial stage of the system, there are two important 
parameters in the Randomness Adjustment Module:  
1) The number of pulse signals input to APUF. Obviously, 
the more the number of pulses counted, the less contingency 
there will be in statistical data, and the randomness index 
calculated from these data is closer to the true value of APUF 
circuit. However, the number of pulse signals input to APUF 
should not be too large, which will increase the initialization 
time of the system and reduce its working efficiency.  
2)Threshold that determines if randomness reaches target, 
that is, the difference value between the proportion of "0" in the 
response bitstream and 50% can be considered as meeting the 
requirement. Obviously, the smaller the difference is, the better 
the randomness index after adjusting APUF (close to 50% of 
the ideal value). However, if the difference value is too small, 
that is, the randomness requirement of APUF is too high, the 
randomness adjustment module may need to go through lots of 
rounds of adjustment to meet the requirements, which will also 
increase the System initialization time and reduce its working 
efficiency. Through the analysis of 1) and 2), from the 
perspective of improving the performance of APUF system, we 
should increase the number of pulse signals and reduce the 
difference value between threshold and 50%. However, this 
will increase the time redundancy of the system. Therefore, in 
practice, we need to set these two parameters in combination 
with the specific scene. 
The principle of Randomness Adjustment Module is shown 
in the diagram in Fig. 2, The meanings of each symbol in the 
diagram are as Table. Ⅰ. 
Here, we set the number of pulses in the input APUF to be 
96, so in an ideal situation, "0" in the response bit should 
account for 50%, i.e., 48. Meantime, we set the difference 
between the threshold value and the ideal value as 6, that is 
when the number of "0" in the response bitstream is between 42 
and 54, we believe that the APUF circuit meets the randomness 
requirement. 
 
From Fig. 2, we can see that when Num_CLK counts to 96, 
we need to determine whether Num_Arb[0] is greater than 42 
and less than 54. If so, we find the balance point, then we set 
Num_CLK and Num_Arb[0] to 0, note that Adjust_up and 
Adjust_low cannot be set to zero, but should remain unchanged. 
Meantime, we set the flag bit Fready to “1” for use by other 
modules at the same time, indicating that the adjustment of the 
Randomness Adjustment Module has ended, 
namely completion of System initialization. If Num_Arb[0] is 
less than 42, it means that the number of "1" in the response 
bitstream is too large, and the upper delay path needs to be 
increased, that is, a compensation unit is added in the upper 
compensation path. Then Num_CLK and Num_Arb[0] should 
set to 0 and begin to  count again. Conversely, if Num_Arb[0] 
is greater than 54, it means that the number of "0" in the 
response bitstream is too large, a compensation unit is added in 
the lower compensation path. As before, Num_CLK and 
Num_Arb[0] should set to 0 and begin to  count again. 
 
Fig. 2.  The working flow of Randomness Adjustment Module 
Start
Press the RST on FPGA
Num_CLK=96?
 42≤Num_Arb[0]≤ 54?
Num_CLK=0; Num_Arb[0]=0; 
Fready=1
 Num_Arb[0]<42
Num_CLK and Num_Arb[0] 
begin to count
End
Y
Y
N
Adjust_up=Adjust_up+1；
Num_CLK=0; Num_Arb[0]=0; 
Adjust_low=Adjust_low+1；
Num_CLK=0; Num_Arb[0]=0; 
Y
N
N
TABLE I 
MEANINGS OF EACH SYMBOL IN THE DIAGRAM 
Symbol Meaning 
Num_CLK pulse number input to APUF 
Num_Arb[0] number of "0" in the output response bitstream 
Adjust_up number of compensation units in the upper 
compensation path in the Randomness Adjustment 
Module. If the upper delay path is relatively short in 
each round of judgment, the variable adds 1 
Adjust_low number of compensation units in the lower 
compensation path in the Randomness Adjustment 
Module. If the lower delay path is relatively short in 
each round of judgment, the variable adds 1 
Fready The flag bit that indicates the completion of System 
initialization. If the flag is 1, system initialization has 
been completed; otherwise, system initialization is in 
progress 
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C. Design of dual-LFSR structure 
The linear feedback shift register takes the linear function of 
the output of the previous state and inputs it again into the shift 
register, the initial value of the input to LFSR is called the seed. 
LFSR is simple in structure and easy to implement. It can be 
used to produce uniformly distributed pseudo-random 
sequences. The n-order linear feedback shift register consists of 
n flip-flops and several XOR gates. According to the 
connection mode between XOR gate and flip-flop, linear 
feedback shift register can be divided into two realization 
modes, namely Fibonacci LFSR and Galois LFSR [9]. Since 
Fibonacci LFSR's XOR gates are all on the feedback loop, the 
combined logic delay of the feedback loop will increase. In 
order to further improve the circuit speed of LFSR, Galois 
LFSR is selected here. The n-order LFSR structure 
implemented by Galois is shown in Fig. 3.  
The period of LFSR is only related to its feedback mode and 
has nothing to do with its seed value. According to the different 
feedback mode, the characteristic polynomial of LFSR is 
derived. The characteristic polynomial of LFSR is a digital 
model that represents the structural characteristics of linear shift 
registers. The characteristic polynomial of Galois LFSR shown 
in Fig. 3 is shown in Equation (1), 
p(x) =g0+g1x+ g2x2 + g3x3 +…+ gnxn 
Where gi  is 0 or 1, if gi is 0, there is no feedback at that point, 
if gi is 1, there is feedback at that point. Note that in the n order 
LFSR, gn is always assumed to be 1. Otherwise, if gn is 0, the n 
order LFSR will degenerate to (n-1) order LFSR. Always 
assume that g0 is 1, otherwise if g0 is 0, there is no feedback 
loop and the linear feedback shift register becomes a linear shift 
register. n order LFSR has at most 2n states, but under linear 
operation, all 0 states will not be transferred to other states, so 
LFSR traverses at most 2n-1 states, that is, the longest period of 
output sequence is 2n-1, we call such sequence as the maximum 
length sequence, also known as m-sequence. In order to 
distinguish the sequence types (state types) of LFSR, we divide 
all sequences of LFSR into useful sequences, useless sequences 
and additional sequences. Among them, all 0 sequences are 
called useless sequences, the main cyclic sequences in the state 
transition diagram are called useful sequences, and the 
remaining sequences are called additional sequences. To further 
illustrate the three kinds of sequences, LFSR of order 3, whose 
characteristic polynomial is x3+x2+x +1, is taken as an example. 
The classification of all sequences is shown in Fig. 4. Note that 
the LFSR's useful sequence cannot contain the repetition 
sequence of a certain sequence; not all LFSRs have additional 
sequences. For LFSRs that can produce m-sequences, the 
number of useful sequences is up to 2n-1. Therefore, all 
sequences can only be divided into useful sequences and useless 
sequences for LFSR with m-sequences. In addition, in practical 
application, when LFSR is used as a pseudo-random number 
generator, the pseudo-random sequence we need is the useful 
sequences generated by LFSR. 
The proposed PUF obfuscates challenge by dual-LFSR 
structure, the schematic is shown in Fig.5. The external 
challenges(green challenges) are the seeds of both LFSR. The 
real challenges of the underlying APUF circuit (black 
challenges) may come from LFSR1 (blue challenges) or LFSR2 
(red challenges). Specifically, the real challenges of the 
underlying APUF circuit are determined by the previous 
response bit of the APUF. If the previous response bit of APUF 
is "0", the current real challenges are derived from LFSR1. If 
the previous response bit is "1", the current real challenges are 
derived from LFSR2. The challenge bit of LFSR1 is 𝐶1𝑖(𝑘), the 
challenge bit of LFSR2 is 𝐶2𝑖(𝑘), and the current real challenge 
bit is  𝐶?̂?(𝑘) . The relationship between the current real 
challenge  𝐶?̂?(𝑘)  and the previous response bit 𝑅(𝑘 − 1)  is 
shown the following. 
𝐶?̂?(𝑘) = {
𝐶1𝑖(𝑘)            𝑅(𝑘 − 1) = 0      
𝐶2𝑖(𝑘),            𝑅(𝑘 − 1) = 1      
 
Different from the obfuscation challenge of the previous 
time-invariant mapping function, this obfuscation challenge 
method is essentially a time-varying mapping function. In 
addition to the obfuscation challenge, a time factor and the 
previous response bit factor are introduced into the mapping 
function, as shown in Equation (2), 
?̂?(𝑘) = 𝑓(𝐶(𝑘), 𝑡, 𝑅(𝑘 − 1)) 
 
Fig. 4.  Classification of all sequences of 3-order LFSR with characteristic 
polynomial x3+x2+x+1 
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Fig. 5.  Schematic of obfuscation challenge for dual-LFSR structure 
Dn Dn-1 Dn-2 D3 D2 D1
gn gn-1 gn-2 gn-3 g1g2g3
CLK
g0
 
Fig. 3.  Galois LFSR structure 
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Where ?̂?(𝑘) is current real challenge which is actually the seed 
of two LFSRs, 𝐶(𝑘) is current external challenge, 𝑡 is the time 
interval between the input of the current external challenge 
𝐶(𝑘) and the present (number of clocks), 𝑅(𝑘 − 1) is previous 
response bit of APUF. Compared to the previous time-invariant 
function mapping  𝑓  of a single variable, this time-variant 
mapping function  𝑓 of multiple variables is more complex and 
difficult to predict. 
In the dual LFSR structure proposed in this paper, we need 
to construct two LFSR of the same order with the maximum 
period and the same useful sequences. After analysis, we need 
to obtain two groups of m-sequences of the same order LFSR, 
which can meet the above requirements. If an n-order LFSR 
produces an m-sequence with period number 2n-1, then its 
characteristic polynomial is irreducible, but not all irreducible 
polynomials can generate m-sequence, and the irreducible 
polynomial that can generate m-sequence is called the primitive 
polynomial. We can use Matlab software to solve the primitive 
polynomial. 
In order to quantitatively explain the working principle of 
APUF with dual LFSR structure, we take the 3-order LFSR as 
an example for analysis. First of all, there are two primitive 
polynomials of 3-order LFSR, which are x3+x+1 and x3 +x2+1 
respectively. According to both primitive polynomials, the 
corresponding Galois LFSR is shown in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 
respectively. For the 3-order Galois LFSR in Fig. 6, it is 
assumed that the seed value at the beginning is (D3D2D1) = 
(001), according to the state transition equation: 
D3 = D1 
D2 = D3 
D1 = D2^ D1  
It can be concluded that when the next clock edge arrives, the 
output value of LFSR jumps, (D3D2D1) = (101), and so on, 7 
states can be obtained. State transition diagram is drawn, as 
shown in Fig. 8. Similarly, the state transition diagram of 3-
order Galois LFSR in Fig. 7 is drawn, as shown in Fig. 9. 
Conventional APUF circuits generally use an LFSR as an 
challenge extension circuit. When the initial challenge (seed) is 
input into the APUF circuit to produce a response bit, LFSR 
start to shift from the initial challenge (seed), and then the 
shifted challenge is input to the APUF circuit to produce a 
response bit, and so on. In essence, LFSR is used as a pseudo-
random number generator to generate random challenges. The 
dual-LFSR APUF proposed in this paper uses two LFSRs to 
generate random challenges. We first input seed to the two 
LFSRs, and then shift the two LFSRs respectively under the 
same clock signal. Finally, At a certain clock, either of both 
output sequences of the two LFSRs is selected as the challenge 
according to the previous response bit. 
After the above analysis, the realization of dual LFSR 
structure needs to meet several conditions: 1) The useful 
sequences of the two LFSR should be the same. If the useful 
sequences of two LFSRs are different, it is assumed that the 
useful sequence of the LFSR1 contains sequence-A ,  but the 
useful sequence of LFSR2 does not contain sequence-A. In this 
case, if sequence-A is used as the seed input for two LFSR, the 
LFSR1 can work normally to produce useful sequence, while 
the LFSR2 can't work normally and may not produce useful 
sequence, which will lead to the dual LFSR can't normally 
produce challenge signal. We should try our best to avoid this 
situation. 2) The period of the two LFSR should be as large as 
possible, that is, the useful sequences of the two LFSR should 
 
Fig. 8.  State transition diagram of 3-order LFSR in Fig.6 
010
001
110
011
111101
100
000
 
Fig. 6.  3-order Galois LFSR with characteristic polynomial x3+x+1 
D3 D2 D1
g3=1 g1=1
CLK
g0=1
 
Fig. 7.  3-order Galois LFSR with characteristic polynomial x3+x2+1 
D3 D2 D1
g3=1 g2=1
CLK
g0=1
 
Fig. 9.  State transition diagram of 3-order LFSR in Fig.7 
010
001
101
111
110011
100
000
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be as many as possible. In fact, the real challenge of the input 
APUF is derived from the useful sequences of the two LFSRs. 
As a strong PUF, APUF has a large CRPs set, so the challenge 
set size of underlying APUF circuit should be as large as 
possible. 3) The number of useful sequences (periods) of the 
two LFSRs should be the same. If two LFSRs have different 
numbers of useful sequences, the two LFSRs must have 
different useful sequences. Suppose the number of useful 
sequences of LFSR1 is α, and the number of useful sequences 
of the second LFSR2 is β, where α>β. In this case, even if the β 
sequences in  useful sequence of LFSR1 are the same as those 
in LFSR2, LFSR2 has at least (β-α) more useful sequences that 
LFSR2 dose not have. 
According to the previous design, the schematic diagram of 
dual-LFSR APUF is generally divided into three parts, as 
shown in Fig. 10: 
① -Challenge Generator Unit, it consists of dual-LFSR 
structure and a control module; 
② -APUF Unit, a conventional APUF circuit; 
③ -Post Processing Unit, including path compensation 
module (for better randomness), arbiter, Voter Module (for 
better reliability) and XOR Module (for generating 1 bit 
response). 
Based on the above analysis, it is necessary to construct two 
LFSRs of the same order to realize the dual-LFSR structure, at 
the same time, both LFSR can produce m-sequence. The cheme 
of response generation is as followings: 
1. External challenge acts as the initial value (seed) of the 
two LFSRs. When the external challenges are input to 
dual LFSR structure, the two LFSRs begin to shift.  
2. The real challenge of APUF circuit is determined by 
the previous response bit of the APUF. The current 
real challenge will be selected between the two LFSRs 
according to the previous response. 
3. Assuming the APUF unit run 5 times, the 5 response 
bits generated by APUF are XORed as the final 
response bit of the dual-LFSR APUF.  
4. Path Compensation Module, which compensates the 
shorter paths, is employed to improve the randomness. 
A Voter Module is used to improve the reliability of 
APUF.  
Take 3-order LFSR as an example, and its state transition 
diagram is shown in Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 respectively. We know 
that the external challenges are the seeds of the two LFSRs. 
Assuming seed=001, the real challenge waveform generated by 
the dual LFSR is shown in Fig. 11. Fig. 11 is the waveform of 
each signal in the dual-LFSR structure when the external 
challenge(seed) is "001", where the response "R" is the assumed 
waveform of final response and the signal "Chg" is the internal 
real challenge waveform. As can be seen from the Fig. 11, 
which state value of LFSR is selected as the actual challenge 
"Chg" under the current clock is determined by the value of the 
response bit under the previous clock. As a contrast, the 
waveform of each signal in the dual-LFSR structure when the  
external challenge(seed) is "110" is as shown in Fig. 12. 
Combined with Fig. 11 and Fig. 12, we can see that with the 
change of external challenge (seed), the jump mechanism of 
real challenge between the two LFSRs will also change greatly, 
and this time-variant obfuscation challenge method is difficult 
to decipher from the outside. However, how to ensure the 
stability of PUF while adopting the time-variant method of 
challenge obfuscation becomes an important problem. 
The states of the main loop in the state transition diagram of 
0 0
1
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1 1
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Fig. 11. Waveform of each signal in the dual-LFSR structure with seed "001" 
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Fig. 10. Proposed schematic diagram of PUF 
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Fig. 12. Waveform of each signal in the dual-LFSR structure with seed "110" 
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two LFSRs should be identical(number of states and type of 
states), but the state jump rules of two LFSRs should be 
different. When the external challenge (seed) is fed into the 
dual LFSR structure, the seed does not fall outside the main 
cycle state of the two LFSRs. When the seed is input to both 
LFSRs, the states of two LFSRs in the following several shifts 
are uniquely determined by the seed. The reliability of the 
underlying APUF must be extremely high. When the seed is 
input to both LFSRs, the response bits of dual-LFSR APUF in 
the following several cycles are uniquely determined by the 
seed. In order to ensure the stability of PUF while adopting the 
time-variant method of challenge obfuscation becomes an 
important problem. 
1. Two LFSRs can produce m-sequence; 
2. The reliability of the underlying APUF is 1.0. 
III. PROPOSED AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL  
In a real authentication scenario, such as an RFID system, the 
attacker may eavesdrops the physical signals of a legitimate tag, 
captures and restores large number of interactive signals. Then, 
the attacker replays the exactly same signals to the reader 
according to the restored signals [10].  
A. The design principle of authentication against Man-in-the-
Middle Attack 
During the authentication of a legitimate user, the server 
sends a certain challenge signal S1 for the first time, and PUF 
replies to the corresponding response signal R1. Assuming that 
these signals happen to be eavesdropped by the attacker, as 
shown in Fig. 13 (a). Assuming that the server is not aware of 
this, when the server sends the challenge signal for the second 
time, the attacker directly responds to the corresponding 
response signal according to the stored interaction signal to 
complete identity authentication, as shown in Fig. 13 (b).  
In a man-in-the-middle attack, an attacker eavesdrops on and 
stores the physical signals of the interaction between the server 
and the PUF device, regardless of the content and meaning of 
the physical signals. At this level, an attacker can impersonate 
a legitimate device for authentication as long as the server 
repeatedly uses a certain challenge signal. To solve this 
problem, we consider whether information can be transmitted 
using certain parameter other than the physical signal. This 
paper takes high-frequency RFID as the authentication scenario, 
in which PUF is at the tag end and the server is at the reader 
end. In the specific authentication process, we load the 
information that needs to be interacted onto the carrier signal of 
the RFID system. In addition, during a authentication process, 
k-bit responses is required. In order to generate k-bit responses 
in PUF, we adopt the parallel structure of k dual-LFSR APUF 
and the mechanism of two authentications, as shown in Fig. 14.  
During the authentication process, we input the same 
challenge signal to these k dual LFSR APUF. We load 2 groups 
of challenges onto the carrier in turn according to time, where 
the time interval between two successive groups of challenges 
is defined as t. Obviously, t is the information hidden in the 
interaction other than the physical signal. We can combine the 
challenges and t to send an challenge signal to the PUF device. 
In this way, even if the attacker successfully captures the 
challenge signal S2 sent by the server and the response signal 
R2 returned by the PUF device, it is impossible for the attacker 
to know the meaning of the time interval t. Assuming that the 
server sends the challenge signal S2 again, the attacker will 
reply R2 according to the stored S2-R2. Obviously, the attacker 
only collects the challenge signal S2, but does not collect the 
hidden information t, or even does not know the meaning of the 
information t. However, for a legitimate PUF device, not only 
the hidden information t can be captured, but also its meaning 
can be analyzed and the response signal R'2 can be returned after 
modifying the response signal accordingly, as shown in Fig. 15.  
In order to realize the above scheme, we can extract the odd 
and even property of time interval t, and modify the response 
signal accordingly. As shown in Fig. 14, if the t is odd, LFSR 
will be selected according to the original method (LFSR1 if the 
previous response value is "0", otherwise LFSR2 will be 
selected) to generate the real challenge. If the t is even, LFSR 
will be selected to generate the real challenge according to the 
opposite method (LFSR2 if the previous response value is "0", 
otherwise LFSR1 will be selected). As shown in Fig. 5, the 
relationship between the current real challenge  𝐶?̂?(𝑘)  and the 
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Fig.13. Attacker counterfeits legitimator for man-in-the-middle attack 
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Fig.14. Authentication process in the parallel structure of k dual-LFSR 
APUF 
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8 
previous response bit 𝑅(𝑘 − 1) is shown the following. 
𝐶?̂?(𝑘) = {
𝐶1𝑖(𝑘)           𝑅(𝑘 − 1) = 0      
𝐶2𝑖(𝑘),            𝑅(𝑘 − 1) = 1      
𝑡 − 𝑜𝑑𝑑 
𝐶?̂?(𝑘) = {
𝐶2𝑖(𝑘)           𝑅(𝑘 − 1) = 0      
𝐶1𝑖(𝑘),            𝑅(𝑘 − 1) = 1      
𝑡 − 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛 
B. Authentication Device 
Authentication devices generally include PUF device and 
server device. The PUF device is the label end. Note that the 
label end does not have a separate power supply, and the energy 
consumption of the label end comes from the electromagnetic 
signals emitted by the reader. The server device is the reader 
end. Note that the reader is connected to a larger software 
platform on which each module can be modeled. 
The PUF device is implemented by k parallel APUF circuits 
and k matching parallel dual-LFSR challenge obfuscation 
circuits, challenge preprocessor and shift register circuits, the 
specific block diagram is shown in Fig. 16. As the front-end of 
PUF device, the challenge preprocessor is used to receive the 
signals sent by the server device, extract the challenge signals 
C1 and C2 of the data bits, and extract the time interval of the 
two groups of data bits. According to the parity of the time 
interval, a signal “M” is sent out to control the rotation 
mechanism of the two LFSRs in each dual-LFSR challenge 
obfuscation circuit. As the secondary challenge preprocessor, 
the dual-LFSR challenge obfuscation circuit receives N-bit 
challenge signal C sent by the challenge preprocessor as the 
seed of two LFSRs on the one hand, and receives "M" signals 
sent by the challenge preprocessor on the other hand, and 
switches the sequential selection of the two LFSRs according 
to the M value. Driven by two sets of input signals, k parallel 
dual-LFSR challenge obfuscation circuits generate N-bit 
obfuscated challenge C'. Note that the two LFSR structures of 
k dual-LFSR challenge obfuscation circuits are different to 
increase the complexity of recognition mechanism. As the 
secondary of dual-LFSR challenge obfuscation circuit, the 
challenge signal of APUF circuit has two sources, one is from 
the front dual-LFSR circuit, namely, obfuscated challenge C'. 
The other comes from the Disposable Interface, which is the 
challenge C directly from the external input. The Disposable 
Interface is mainly to extract the naked CRP of the underlying 
APUF circuit, and then establish a database of naked CRPs on 
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Fig.17. Components of sever 
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(a) An attacker eavesdrops on the interactive authentication between a 
legitimate PUF device and the server, capturing and storing S2-R2 pairs 
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(b) When the server sends signal S2 again, the attacker responds directly to 
R2 based on the stored interaction pair. However, the response signal should 
be R'2 prime, so authentication is rejected 
Server
(Reader)
Carrier Wave
Send Challenge 
Signal
Reply Response 
Signal
Carrier Wave
S2(+t)
R’2
√
Succeed 
Authentication
PUF1
PUF2
PUFk
(Tag)
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Fig.15. Schematic of authentication against man-in-the-middle attack 
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the server side. Note that the Disposable Interface can only be 
used during the registration phase and is permanently fused 
after use to prevent an attacker from obtaining the naked CRPs 
through the interface. In addition, special attention should be 
paid to the preservation of PUF device before registration 
because the Disposable Interface is exposed after leaving the 
factory. It is better to adopt the physical shielding strategy to 
protect the Disposable Interface. As the secondary of K parallel 
APUF, the shift register can convert the parallel k-bit response 
ri (i=1,2……,k) into serial k-bit response Rp. In this way, the 2N-
bit challenge signal S2(+t) can correspond one-to-one with the 
N-bit response signal Rp. 
Unlike PUF devices implemented on hardware platforms, 
server devices are implemented on software platforms. It 
mainly includes all naked CRPs of k parallel APUFs, k 
matching parallel dual-LFSR model, challenge preprocessor 
model, shift register model, random sequence generator and 
sequence comparator. The specific block diagram is shown in 
Fig. 17. Among them, all naked CRPs of k parallel APUFs have 
to be extremely reliable. Only the bottom circuit from APUF1 
to APUFk has high reliability, can ensure the dual-LFSR APUF 
circuit has high reliability, and then ensure the accuracy of the 
authentication process. Other modules such as k parallel dual-
LFSR model, challenge preprocessor model and shift register 
model have exactly the same function as the corresponding 
module in Fig. 16, so it is easier to implement on the software 
platform. For the two extra modules, the random sequence 
module generates two N-bit random challenge S2. Note that the 
time interval t between the two random challenges in the signal 
S2 is also random. The Sequence Comparator is used to 
compare whether the N-bit response Rm produced by the server 
device and the N-bit response Rp produced by the PUF device 
are equal. If it is determined to be equal, the 1-bit decision value 
“1” will be generated and the authentication this time will be 
passed; if not, the 1-bit decision value “0” will be generated and 
the authentication this time will be refused. Pay attention to in 
the actual process of authentication, APUF model in server 
device can't be with APUF circuit in PUF device is exactly the 
same, and all the response bits of the APUF circuit in PUF 
device cannot be stable when the environment changes. We can 
set a threshold where Rm and Rp can be authenticated when 
there are only a few bits different. Note that the range of 
threshold must be strictly controlled by combining the size of k 
value, the reliability of APUF circuit and the accuracy of APUF 
model, otherwise false authentication may occur.  
C. Authentication Protocol 
The authentication protocol consists of three parts: PUF 
devices, server devices, and Trusted Third Party (TTP). There 
are two stages: registration stage and authentication stage. The 
authentication protocol is shown in Fig. 18. 
The first phase is the registration stage. This phase relates to 
TTP and communication interaction with the server device and 
the communication interaction between TTP and PUF device. 
The first step is to activate the PUF device and then input an 
challenge through the Disposable Interface to the APUF circuit 
of the PUF device. In the second step, the APUF circuit of PUF 
device returns the corresponding response according to the 
input challenge of the first step. Through this step, CRPs of 
APUF circuit of k group of PUF device can be collected. After 
TTP has collected all CRPs, it is necessary to physically fuse 
the Disposable Interface to prevent attackers from obtaining 
naked CRPs of APUF circuit through the interface. The third 
step is to establish the naked CRPs database of k group APUF 
according to the collected k group CRPs set and transfer the 
built database to the server device. In the fourth step, The TTP 
builds models of other modules in the APUF device and 
transmits these models to the server device, based on the PUF 
device's parametric characteristics (mainly tap information) 
about the dual LFSRs provided by the manufacturer. At this 
point, the registration phase is complete. Note that the TTP is 
best served by the manufacturer so that it can be registered 
before leaving the factory, minimizing the scope for knowing 
the internal structure of the PUF device and preventing 
attackers from stealing naked CRPs through the Disposable 
Interface before registering the PUF device. 
The second phase is the authentication stage. Authentication 
phase is the core of authentication protocol, which involves the 
communication interaction between server device and PUF 
device. In the first step of this stage, the server device needs to 
send the first set of random challenge C1 to the PUF device and 
transfer the challenge internally to the challenge preprocessor. 
After this set of challenge is received by PUF device, PUF 
device obfuscates it, and then inputs k parallel APUF circuits to 
generate k-bit parallel response. After parallel serial processing, 
the final k-bit response signal Rp is generated, and then sent it 
to the server. Similarly, at the server device end, random 
challenge C1 received internally will also generate k-bit 
response signal Rm after calculation by the internal module 
model. Finally, the sequence comparator in server end 
compares Rp and Rm and generates the value of the decision bit 
by determining whether Rp and Rm are equal. In the third step, 
TTP
Server
(Reader)
PUF
(Tag)
1
.A
ct
iv
a
te
 P
U
F
 a
n
d
 R
e
q
u
e
st
 n
a
ke
d
 C
R
P
s
2
.N
a
ke
d
 C
R
P
s
3
.B
u
ild
 th
e
 n
a
ke
d
 C
R
P
s d
a
ta
b
a
se
 
4
.L
o
a
d
 t
h
e
 t
a
p
s 
o
f 
th
e
 d
o
u
b
le
 L
F
S
R
 s
tr
u
ct
u
re
4
.L
o
a
d
 th
e
 ta
p
s o
f th
e
 d
u
a
l L
F
S
R
 stru
ctu
re
5.Generate challenge C1(+t)
6.Response R1
7.Generate challenge C2(+t)
8.Response R2
S2(+t)
G2 PASS? REJECT?
 
Fig.18. Authentication Protocol 
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10 
the server device sends a second random challenge C2 to the 
PUF device while passing the time interval t from within to the 
challenge preprocessor. Note in this step that the random 
sequence generator randomly determines the time interval t 
between the second C2 and the first C1 before the server sends 
the signal. In the fourth step, after the PUF device receives the 
signal, in addition to extracting and processing the random 
challenge C2(specific as the second step), the t hidden between 
the two groups of challenges shall also be extracted, and the 
parity of the t value shall be judged to determine the "M" value, 
and then the k-bit response signal Rp shall be generated. 
Similarly, the above operation will be directly repeated on the 
server side to generate the k-bit response signal Rm. The t value 
is simply sent directly to the challenge preprocessor, so there is 
no need to extract the size of the t value from the carrier. Finally, 
the server compares the Rp and Rm to produce the value of the 
decision bit. 
Considerations during the authentication phase: 1) To ensure 
that no false authentication occurs, it is important to be very 
careful about determining the sequence comparator threshold 
size, which in principle should be as small as possible. 2) In the 
second authentication process, only if the decision position of 
the first and second authentication is "1", can the authentication 
be determined as passed. At the first authentication (C1-R1 
interaction), the server device does not receive a response signal 
or an incorrect response signal, and the value of the decision bit 
is "0". At this point, the server will simply reject the 
authentication request, without the need for a second 
authentication. 
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